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CASE NOTES
Conflict of Laws-Babcock Rule Applied to Determination of Limitation

on Liability in Wrongful Death Action.-Decedent, a New York domiciliary,
died when an airplane of defendant, a Massachusetts corporation, crashed
in Massachusetts en route from New York to Nantucket. The ticket was
purchased in New York. Plaintiff, executor of the decedent's estate, brought
an action under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute' in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.2 The beneficiaries
of the action, decedent's widow and four children, were not domiciliaries of
New York when the suit was commenced: two children were California domiciliaries, and the widow and remaining children, though domiciled in New York
when the accident occurred, had since moved and were domiciled in Maryland
at the time of suit. Plaintiff, relying on Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.3 and
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 4 moved that defendant's affirmative defense, that liability be limited to the amount provided in the Massachusetts
statute, be stricken, because limitations on recovery in wrongful death actions
are contrary to New York's public policy. Held, motion denied. The New York
policy, as expressed in Kilberg and Pearson, was intended only for dependents
who are domiciled in New York at the time of suit, and the forum had no
basis for disregarding the liability limitation when, as here, the jurisdictions
(California and Maryland) which had the superior interest in the surviving
dependents would have enforced it. Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F.
Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
In matters concerning choice of law in tort liability, New York has recently
undertaken a sudden departure from its former position. Traditionally the law
of the locus delicti applied to all substantive issues involving existence and
extent of liability. 5 Then came Kilberg, which arose out of the same occurrence
upon which the instant case was decided. There the New York Court of Appeals,
in dictum,6 said it would refuse to enforce the Massachusetts limitation because
to do so was contrary to New York's public policy, even though the Massa1. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229, § 2 (1955). This statute provided that the amount
recoverable if defendant were held liable was not to exceed $15,000. Note that the statute
has since been amended to provide for a recovery of not more than $30,000. Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1963).

2. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. Thus the federal court, sitting
as a New York court, was required to apply New York conflicts prindples. Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
3. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
4. 199 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd en banc, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.), reversing
307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
5. See, e.g., Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 260 (3d ed. 1949).
6. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 41, 172 N.E.2d 526, 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 137 (1961). The complaint

alleged two causes of action-one for wrongful death and the other for breach of defendant's contract of safe carriage. The court's holding was limited to affirmance of the dismissal
of the contract cause, which was the only issue before the court. See Dyke v. Erie Ry., 45
N.Y. 113 (1871).
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chusetts statute, as the law of the locus delicti, would be-at least under present

law-the necessary basis for the cause of action and would control as to the

standard of conduct required to determine liability. 7 One year later Pearson

followed, in which the dictum of Kilberg was accepted as the prevailing law
of New York, and therefore was to be applied by federal courts sitting in New
York in diversity cases. Pearson added that it was not a denial of full faith and
credit for the forum to apply its policy against limitations on liability in wrong-

ful death actions when enforcing a right created under the lex loci containing

such a limitation. Finally, Babcock v. Jackson8 completely overturned the
traditional approach and formulated a "significant contacts" theory, under
which the choice of law New York will hereafter make in determining issues of

tort liability will be governed by the law of the jurisdiction which has the
superior interest in the particular issue involved. As yet few guidelines have
developed to assist the forum in choosing between jurisdictions having con-

flicting interests.' 0 The present decision represents an attempt to provide such
a guide, at least with respect to wrongful death actions.
Judge McGohey in the instant decision pointed out that the vital distinction
between the facts of this case and those of Kilberg and of Pearson was that,
in the latter instances, the intended beneficiaries of the wrongful death pro-

ceedings-the dependents of the decedent-were domiciled in the forum state,
whereas here the forum lacked such interest. Although Kilberg had given ex-

pression to New York's interest " 'in providing its residents or users of transportation facilities tkere originating with full compensation for wrongful
death,'"" Judge McGohey felt that the above cases were concerned primarily

with the protection of the beneficiaries of the action, reasoning from the purpose behind the enactment of wrongful death statutes.' 2 Thus in choosing the

7. In his concurring opinion in Kilberg, Judge Fuld, who wrote the majority opinion
in Babcock v. Jackson (see note 8 infra), said that the wrongful death statute of New
York might be applied in its entirety since New York was the jurisdiction having "the
most significant contacts." But according to Judge Fuld, the court of appeals was constrained from so holding because of the well-established precedent of that court that the
New York wrongful death statute (N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 130) would not be given
extraterritorial effect in cases where injury and death occur outside of the state. 9 N.Y.2d
at 44-45, 172 N.E.2d at 531, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 140-41 (concurring opinion). In light of
the revisionary view of the court of appeals expressed in Babcock v. Jackson, New York
in the future might apply the entire wrongful death statute of the state found to have
the most significant contacts.
8. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
9. Babcock refused to apply Ontario's automobile guest statute to bar a personal
injury action by a New York domiciled plaintiff against a New York domiciled defendant,
where Ontario's only contact with the occurrence was that it happened to be the locus
delicti. See 32 Fordham L. Rev. 158 (1963).
10. See generally Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Conflict
of Laws, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1212 (1963); Currie, id. at 1235, 1241; Leflar, Id. at 1251;
Reese, id. at 1253.
11. Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F. Supp. at 52.
12. Id. at 52-53. In support of this contention, the judge referred to two New York
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jurisdiction which has the "superior interest" in the issue of the extent of
recovery in such an action, the determining factor seems to be the domicile of
the dependents.
Turning then to these jurisdictions--California and Maryland-the court,
in a statement pregnant with confusion, 13 posed the question of whether New
York would refuse to enforce the Massachusetts limitation if it were found
that California, were it the forum, would itself refuse to enforce it. 14 Finding
that the conflicts principles of California would require the courts of that
state to make an automatic application of the lex loci delicti in determining this
issue, it held that New York, as a disinterested forum, would be impelled
similarly to apply the Massachusetts limitation.
Maryland, on the other hand, is compelled by statute", to apply the entire
substantive rules of liability of the state in which the tort occurred, leaving only
procedural matters to the forum. This, too, would require New York's disinterested submission to the hypothetical determination of a Maryland court. 10
The language in which the argument was couched, however, leads to doubt
as to the precise effect Judge McGohey gave to the law of the states of domicile.
At first glance it appears that the forum was sitting as a court of the state with
the strongest interest and applying its entire law, including its conflicts principles. But, perhaps significantly, he did not answer the question of whether
New York would honor the interests of California or Maryland, if it were
assumed that the latter would assert "an interest in securing full indemnity for
its domiciliaries."' 7 This omission would be logical if, as may be, the decision
was based on the lack of New York's interest in the recovery, rather than on
the existence of California's or Maryland's interest.' 8 Can it not be argued, in
cases in which the Kilberg rule was applied, in both of phich it appeared that the
dependents of the deceased New York domiciliary were themselves residents of New
York. Riley v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 889, 215 N.Y.S.2d 295 (4th Dep't
1961) (memorandum decision); Bopp v. Bell, 18 App. Div. 2d 914 (2d Dep't 1963)
(memorandum decision). From the finding here that New York had no interest in the
welfare of persons not domiciled therein, it followed that the Kilberg rule was not applicable.
13. See notes 17-19 infra and accompanying text.
14. "New York would appear to have a basis for disregarding the damage limitation
with respect to the decedent's California children only if it were assumed that, if California
had asserted an interest in securing full indemnity for its domiciliaries deprived of their
expectation of future support by an injury outside the State, New York would honor that
interest." 222 F. Supp. at 53.
15. Md. Ann. Code art. 67, § 2 (1957). Note that this statute is inapplicable to cases
wherein Maryland is the place of death. See State ex rel. Thompson v. Eis Automotive
Corp., 145 F. Supp. 444 (D. Conn. 1956).
16. Implicit in this determination is the proposition that the recovery limitation is
substantive rather than procedural. Since the forum characterizes, it is proper to look to
New York law for an answer to this question. Thus, in view of Davenport v. Webb, 11
N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962), it appears that the above proposition
is correct
17. See note 14 supra.
18. The following language from the opinion indicates that that may have been the
more important factor: "It can hardly be argued that New York has a legally recognizable
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support of this approach, that only the public policy of the forum against
liability limitations, as in Pearson, can justify the ignoring of such a limitation
in applying the wrongful death statute of the locus delicti, and that, in the
case of a disinterested forum, the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution
requires the application of the entire Massachusetts statute? It is submitted
that this is the implication to be drawn from Judge Kaufman's opinion in
Pearson,wherein he stated:
We therefore see no escape from the proposition ...that a legitimately interested
state may, under the circumstances of this case, apply a firmly fixed and long
existing policy of its own, although this would remove a defense provided by an
"integral" provision of the locus' statute creating the cause of action. 10
If so, the present case does not represent an application of the Babcock rule that
the choice of law is to be determined by reference to the law of the state with
the strongest interest, but is a decision simply on the issue of whether the
interest of the forum is strong enough to justify the application of its public
policy as against some of the provisions of an applicable foreign statute, even
under full faith and credit.
If not-that is, if Judge McGohey did not answer the question posed in the
previous paragraph simply because he was not required to under the facts of the
case-there exists an anomaly in this particular application of Babcock. For
here we have Babcock supposedly requiring a New York court to determine the
controversy by blindly adhering to the law of the place where the wrongful act
occurred, because the states ,having the predominant interest in the recovery
are "behind the times" in their approach to choice of law problems. The result
here is to pay veiled respect to remnants of the "vested rights" doctrine which the
Babcock court was so strenuous in rejecting. It seems frivolous to distinguish
between the application by a New York court of the conflicts principles of jurisdictions which follow the old approach and the adherence to this approach by
the New York courts themselves.
The better solution, although one which is still fraught with difficulty, might
be to interpret the Babcock decision as requiring reference to the internal law
of the jurisdiction which has the superior interest in the issue in question. The
dicta in Babcock, to the effect that, if New York were called upon to decide
the issue of defendant's negligence, it would be determinable according to
Ontario's own standards of care, rather than by reference to the law which an
Ontario court might apply (assuming that Ontario might make a different choice
of law as to this issue) would appear to lend support to this interpretation.
Insofar as the instant situation is concerned, this would mean that New York,
as the forum, was simply required to ascertain whether California and/or
Maryland has a strong public policy, similar to New York's, against recovery
limitations in wrongful death actions. If so, the present court should have
applied that policy and granted plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's affirmainterest in the decedent's adult California domidciled children, sufficient to justify New
York's courts in refusing to apply [the Massachusetts limitation] . .. ." 222 F. Supp. at 53.
19. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d at 562 (en banc). (Emphasis added.)
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tive defense. The difficulty with this solution, besides the possibility of a
violation of full faith and credit, 20 is whether New York would thus be giving
extraterritorial effect to California and Maryland law, in contravention of due
process of law. The due process argument was raised, and dismissed, by Judge
Kaufman in the Pearson case, and its application here appears doubtful, in
view of the fact that the relevant inquiry would involve not an application of
those states' wrongful death statutes, but rather
the enforcing of their public
21
policies with regard to their own domiciliaries.
This much is made clear by the instant case: under the Babcock rule, in
determining various aspects of a cause of action, the "superior interests" of
several states may be controlling, depending on the particular issue in controversy. No longer will the law of a single jurisdiction whose interest is strongest
with reference to only some parties or aspects of the litigation, necessarily defeat
the interests of other jurisdictions in altogether different issues.

Constitutional Law-Closing of Schools in Only One County of the State
of Virginia Held Constitutional Under Both State and Federal Constitutions.-Each school year since 1959, plaintiffs, the Division Superintendent
and the School Board of Prince Edward County, submitted to the county
Board of Supervisors estimates of the money needed to operate the public free
schools and requested that the board levy a tax to meet these estimates. The
Board of Supervisors refused to levy such a tax, and as a result, no public free
schools have been in operation in Prince Edward County since that date, while
similar schools in other localities throughout the state remained open. Meanwhile, the school board received funds, characterized as the constitutional
minimum, from the General Assembly. These funds were used for the physical
upkeep of the county high schools. In addition, the Board of Supervisors and
the General Assembly awarded scholarships to parents without discrimination
as to race' which enabled the majority of white children to attend nonsectarian
20. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
21. "A violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires not
only that there be a deprivation of property-and we have found none here-but also
some unreasonable or unreasoned imposition of liability. In the area of conflict of laws,
the Due Process Clause prevents an arbitrary application of a state's jurisprudence to an
out-of-state event." 309 F.2d at 563. It is submitted that such an application of the policies
of California and Maryland for the welfare of their domiciliaries would be reasonable
rather than arbitrary.
1. As of 1961, five of approximately 1800 Negro children and 1327 of approximately
1500 white children in Prince Edward County received scholarAips. All five Negro children
were attending public schools outside Prince Edward County. Private schools organized by
the Prince Edward County Christian Association, where one third of the total number of
Negro children were in attendance, have been denied accreditation by the State Board of
Education. Allen v. School Bd., 198 F. Supp. 497, 499, 501-02 (E.D. Va. 1961), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. granted, 375 U.S. 391 (1964).
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segregated schools operated by the Prince Edward School Foundation, a private
educational corporation. Defendants, members of the Negro race, contended that
the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the State Board of Education, and
plaintiffs are under a mandatory duty to establish, maintain and operate public
free schools in Prince Edward County under the provisions of the Virginia
Constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Plaintiffs, denying that they are under any such duty, brought this action for a
declaratory judgment 2 to obtain an adjudication of their rights, duties and
responsibilities. In affirming the decision of the Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that (1) the General
Assembly is under no duty to maintain schools where the local authorities refuse
to appropriate funds necessary for their operation; (2) the absence of public
free schools in one county while they are being maintained in other counties does
not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; and (3)
scholarships can be given for the education of children residing in a county
where no public free schools are in operation.3 School Bd. v. Griffin, 204 Va. 650,
133 S.E.2d 565 (1963).
2. Va. Code Ann. § 8-578 (1950).
3. In reaching the latter conclusion, the court simply stated that it perceived "nothing
in or out of the statutes [Va. Code Ann. §§ 22-115.29-.35 (1964)] to render these scholarships unavailable to any eligible child in Prince Edward county .... " School Bd. v. GrIffin,
204 Va. 650, 133 S.E.2d 565, 579 (1963). Unfortunately, the dissent makes no reference to
the scholarship plan. However, in an earlier decision in the present litigation-Allen v.
School Bd., 198 F. Supp. 497, 503-04 (ED. Va. 1961), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 375 U.S. 391
(1964)-a federal district court found that the granting of these scholarships in a locality
where no public schools were operating was contrary to the objectives of the plan. District
Judge Lewis argued that the grants were established to afford each student freedom in
choosing private or public schooling, and that in order to qualify for a scholarship, the
child had to be eligible to attend the public school in his locality. Furthermore, the plan's
validity under the first and fourteenth amendments appeared to be open to serious question.
May the Commonwealth give scholarships to children to attend private schools, but
exclude some private schools solely because they are church related? The statute which
sets forth the objectives of the plan provides that they are only available "for the education of children in nonsectarian private schools . . . ." Va. Code Ann. § 22-115.29 (1964).
In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947), Mr. Justice Black, speaking for tile
Court, stated: "[The State of New Jersey] cannot exclude individual . . . members of any
. .. faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation." (Emphasis omitted.) See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) where
the Court upheld the right of a Seventh Day Adventist to collect unemployment compensation, even though she refused, on religious grounds, to accept a position which required
work on Saturdays.
Is not the indirect aid in the present case within the holding of Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 19 (1958): "State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds, or property cannot be squared with the [fourteenth] Amendment's command
that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws"?
Since the instant court concerned itself with neither query, we merely raise the questions
here.
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The litigation involving the school authorities of Prince Edward County began with Davis v. School Bd.,4 a suit instituted by members of the Negro race
in a federal district court in 1952. There it was decreed that state constitutional5 and statutory requirements 6 that white and Negro students attend
segregated schools violated neither 'the Civil Rights Act 7 nor the fourteenth
amendment. This decision was reversed in 1954 by the United States Supreme
Court sub nor. Brown v. Board of Educ.8 Upon rehearing the case was remanded
to the district court for the issuance of orders and decrees consistent with the
Court's opinion.9 In 1955, the district court vacated its original decree but did
not issue a mandatory injunction ordering desegregation.' 0 Plaintiffs applied to
the same court for such an injunction in 1956, but it was refused." Upon application to the resident district judge in 1957, the court declined to issue a
desegregation order but reserved to plaintiffs the right to renew its motion at a
later date. 2 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
and ordered the district court to issue decrees ordering the school authorities
to make a "prompt and reasonable" start toward ending discrimination in the
schools. 13 In 1958, the district court issued such an order, but added that
such action could be deferred until 1965.1 4 In 1959, the court of appeals again
reversed the district court and ordered it to issue a decree requiring immediate
integration of the public free schools of Prince Edward County."' On April 22,
1960, the district court complied. 16 The effect this decree was intended to have,
however, was completely neutralized by the action taken by the Board of
Supervisors at the end of the 1958-1959 school year.17 It was then that the
4. 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952).
5. Va. Const. art. IX, § 140 (1902).
6. Va. Code Ann. § 22-221 (1964).

7. 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Four cases, all involving segregation in public schools, were decided in this case.
9. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 US. 294 (1955).
10. Davis v. School Bd., 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 82 (E.D. Va. 1955).
11. Davis v. School Ed., 142 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Va. 1956). The federal statute under
which the court was formed, 28 US.C. § 2281 (1958), required the constitutionality of a
state statute be in issue. Since the statutes this case was concerned with had already been
declared unconstitutional in the Brown decision, there was no such issue. Hence the court
did not have the power to grant the relief desired.
12. Davis v. School Ed., 149 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Va.), rev'd per curiamn sub nora. Allen
v. School Ed., 249 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 953 (1958).
13. Allen v. School Ed., supra note 12, at 465.
14. Allen v. School Ed., 164 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Va. 1958).
15. Allen v. School Ed., 266 F.2d 507 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 361 US. 830
(1959).
16. See Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332, 334 (4th Cir. 1963), cert., granted,
375 U.S. 391 (1964).
17. This action was apparently in accord with the policy of the Board expressed as
early as May 3, 1956. For on that date, the Board of Supervisors adopted an affirmation,
signed by 4,216 citizens over twenty-one years of age, which provided as follows: "[T]he
separation of the races in the public schools of this county is absolutely necessary and
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Prince Edward School Foundation was formed. This privately endowed educational corporation did not use any public school facilities or receive any financial
aid directly from the state. However, since the 1960-1961 school year, scholarships and a tax-credit system were made available to the parents of children
attending the segregated schools of the Foundation.18
Another suit was brought in the federal district court in 1961. While abstaining from deciding whether the schools should be reopened, the court did
restrain the continuance of the scholarship and the tax-credit system.10 Plaintiffs thereafter applied for a writ of mandamus ordering the Board of Supervisors to appropriate funds for school purposes. The writ was denied by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.2 0 In 1962, plaintiffs returned to the
district court which ordered the schools reopened. 2 1 In an attempt to void
this decision, defendants appealed the district court ruling and instituted the
present action in the Virginia Circuit Court for the City of Richmond. On
appeal, the decision of the district court was reversed, but judgment was re22
served pending the outcome of the instant case.
In the words of the court the principal issue raised in the decision under
consideration was:
whether ...[under] Article IX of the Virginia Constitution and the statutes enacted
pursuant thereto

mandatory duty

. . .
. .

the Commonwealth of Virginia is required and has the

to establish, maintain and operate public free schools in
23

Prince Edward county.

[we] do affirm that we prefer to abandon public schools and educate our children in some
other way if that be necessary to preserve separation of the races in the schools of this
county." 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 780. See Allen v. School Ed., 198 F. Supp. 497, 499 (E.D.
Va. 1961).
18. See 204 Va. at -, -, 133 S.E.2d at 567, 578-79; Allen v. School Ed., 198 F. Supp. at
501. Under the tax-credit system, $56,000 was credited to the Prince Edward School
Foundation as payments on account of county tax bills for the 1960-1961 school year.
At the same time, scholarships paid out to the white students attending the Foundation's
schools amounted to approximately $132,000. 198 F. Supp. at 502-03.
19. Allen v. School Ed., 198 F. Supp. 497 (ED. Va. 1961). It appeared that plaintiffs
were instituting a suit in the state courts of Virginia to determine whether the Commonwealth has a mandatory duty to maintain public schools in the county. This was one of the
reasons for the abstention. Id. at 501.
20. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 203 Va. 321, 124 S.E.2d 227 (1962). The court held
that the levy of a local tax for school purposes by a board of supervisors is done at the
discretion of the board and mandamus will not issue where a discretionary power is involved.
21. Allen v. School Ed., 207 F. Supp. 349 (ED. Va. 1962). Before the decision denying
mandamus was rendered, plaintiffs had filed a supplemental complaint with the district
court. Allen v. School Ed., 28 F.R.D. 367 (E.D. Va. 1961). Also, the district court simultaneously denied a motion that the United States intervene as party plaintiff and that the
State of Virginia and several state officials be added as parties defendant. Allen v. School
Ed., 28 F.R.D. 358 (E.D. Va. 1961).
22. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 375
U.S. 391 (1964).
23. 204 Va. at -, 133 S.E.2d at 570.
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The Virginia public school system has evolved by virtue of numerous constitutional and statutory provisions; no single provision embodies the entire system.24 Section 129 of article IX of the constitution requires that "the General
Assembly shall establish and maintain an efficient system of public free schools
throughout the State." 25 The sections immediately following particularize this
legislative duty. By enacting a comprehensive school code, it has been held, the
General Assembly fulfills its duty under section 129.20 Under the code, the
actual operation of the schools is left to local school boards.2 7 These local
of the state Board of
boards, however, are subject to the general supervision
29
Education2 s and therefore act as state agencies.
To finance the operation of local schools, the constitution requires the General Assembly to allocate certain minimal funds.30 In order to supplement these
admittedly inadequate funds, 3 ' the legislature is further authorized to grant
such additional sums "as it may deem best,"3 2 and local governing authorities
are empowered to levy a property tax "to be apportioned and expended by the
local school authorities

. . .

in establishing and maintaining such schools as in

their judgment the public welfare may require . . .,3
That the exercise of this power to levy a supplementary local tax lay exclusively within the discretion of the local governing authorities was early
established in School Bd. v. Shockley, 34 which held:
[I]t is obvious that it was the purpose of this section to vest in the local authorities
of each county and school district of the state the exclusive power to determine
what additional sums, if any, should be raised by local taxation ....[T]he necessary
implication is that the General Assembly is prohibited by the Constitution from
exercising that power.35
24. Va. Const. art. IX, §§ 129-42, comprise the constitutional provisions, while the
statutory provisions are contained in Va. Code Ann. §§ 22-1 to -275.25 (1964). In interpreting these provisions, it is necessary to construe them as a whole. See Dean v. Paolicelli, 194
Va. 219, 72 S.E.2d 506 (1952); Board of Supervisors v. Cox, 155 Va. 687, 156 S.E. 755
(1931); City of Portsmouth v. Weiss, 145 Va. 94, 133 S.E. 781 (1926); Funkhouser v.
Spahr, 102 Va. 306, 46 SE. 378 (1904).
25. Va. Const. art. IX, § 129.
26. School Ed. v. Board of Supervisors, 169 Va. 213, 193 S.E. 52 (1937)

(per curiam);

Board of Supervisors v. Cox, 155 Va. 682, 156 S.E. 755 (1931).
27. Va. Const. art. IX, § 133 (providing for the establishment of the local school
boards).
28. Va. Const. art. IX,§ 130 (providing for the establishment of the state board).
29. E.g., Kellam v. School Ed., 202 Va. 252, 117 S.E.2d 96 (1960).
30. Va. Const. art. IX, § 135.
31. School Ed. v. Shockley, 160 Va. 405, 412, 168 SE. 419, 422 (1933).
32. Va. Const. art. DC, § 135.
33. Va. Const. art. IX, § 136.
34. 160 Va. 405, 168 SE. 419 (1933).
35. Id. at 413, 168 S.E. at 422. (Emphasis added.) See Griffin v. Board of Supervisors,
203 Va. 321, 124 S.E.2d 227 (1962). See also Board of Supervisors v. School Bd., 182 Va.
266, 28 S.E.2d 698 (1944); School Ed. v. Board of Supervisors, 169 Va. 213, 193 S.E. 52
(1937) (per curiam).
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It has long been the practice of the General Assembly to appropriate such
additional funds "as it may deem best" only on a basis of matching those
raised by the local governing authorities. 38 Accordingly, the granting of necessary supplemental state aid is conditioned on the levying of a local property
tax for school purposes.
Having assessed these aspects of the Virginia Constitution, the instant court
concluded that under such a "local option or home rule system . . . the operation of the schools is left to the determination of the local authorities."37
When, therefore, the local authorities of Prince Edward County refused to
appropriate funds, the General Assembly was under no duty to assume that
responsibility and to operate schools in that locale.38
Conceding that the duty of day-to-day operation of the schools rests on the
local school boards and not the General Assembly, Chief Justice Eggleston, the
lone dissenter, 9 nonetheless argued that section 129, requiring the legislature
to maintain free public schools throughout the state, clearly denotes a duty to
support these institutions in every part of the Commonwealth. 0 While in the
past the General Assembly may have adequately discharged its duty of support
by acting through local authorities, the fact that one of these state agencies
failed to perform its function of appropriating funds with which to operate
the schools did not absolve the legislature of its duty to maintain them by
allocating
funds necessary for the support of "every . . . school district in the
State."41
Harrison v. Day,42 a recent Virginia decision, lends support to Chief Justice
Eggleston's views. There the court interpreted the language of section 129 as
meaning "that the State must support such public free schools in the State as
are necessary to an efficient system .... ,,43 While admitting that it is for the
General Assembly to determine what might constitute such a system, the court
went on to say that the word "efficient" must be given its ordinary meaning.
That is, it
embraces . . . factors [such as] . . . a sufficient number of schools with adequate
teachers, and other basic
buildings and equipment, a sufficient number of competent
44
matters associated with the public school system.
In the instant case, the State neglected to support the public free schools in
Prince Edward County for several years. As a result, there were no such schools
in operation in that county. As Chief Justice Eggleston asked:
36.
37.

38.

204 Va. at -, 133 S.E.2d at 576.
Id. at -, 133 S.E.2d at 569.
Id. at -, 133 S.E.2d at 577.

39. Justices Spratley, Whittle, Snead, I'Anson and Carrico concurred with Justice
Buchanan in a separate opinion. Id. at -, 133 S.E.2d at 580.
40. Id. at -, 133 S.E.2d at 582 (dissenting opinion). See Savage v. Commonwealth ex
rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 186 Va. 1012, 1020, 45 S.E.2d 313, 317 (1947).
41. 204 Va. at -, 133 S.E.2d at 583 (dissenting opinion). (Emphasis added.)
42. 200 Va. 439, 106 S.E.2d 636 (1959).
43. Id. at 450, 106 S.E.2d at 646. (Emphasis added.)
44. Ibid.
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How can there be an efficient system of public free schools without any such schools?
How can there be an efficient system of public free schools "throughout the state"
so long as there are no such schools in Prince Edward county? 45
Relying further on the local option feature of the Virginia school system,
the instant court held that the closing of the schools in Prince Edward County
did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 40 In
other areas of governmental action where a locality has been given the option of performing a specific function, it has been held that complete termination of that function in one locality, even though done to avoid integration, did
not violate the fourteenth amendment. 47 In drawing an analogy to the type of
case under consideration, the court in Griffin v. Board of Supervisors48 said:
[T]here is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment which requires a state, or any of
its political subdivisions with freedom to decide for itself, to provide schooling for
any of its citizens. Schools that are operated must be made available to all citizens
without regard to race, but what public schools a state provides is not the subject
of constitutional command. . . . [W]hen there is a total cessation of operation of
an independent school system, there is no denial of equal protection of the laws... 4
Since the local option system was present here and no students, white or Negro,
were attending a public free school in Prince Edward County, the instant court
concluded that there was no violation of the fourteenth amendment.
In deciding the latter point, however, the majority made no reference to
Hall v. School Bd.50 That case involved a Louisiana statute which gave the
local school board an option to close the public free schools upon a vote of its
qualified electors. Pursuant to its prerogative, the School Board of St. Helena
Parish closed all its public schools. Finding that the clear purpose of the statute
was to avoid integration, a United States district court held it unconstitutional
primarily because
inevitably, another effect of the statute is to discriminate geographically against all
students, white and colored, in St. Helena or any other community where the schools
are closed under its provisions....
Thus, it is clear enough that, absent a reasonable basis for so classifying, a state
cannot close the public schools in one area while, at the same time, it maintains
schools elsewhere with public funds. 0 '
Since education at the primary and perhaps also at the secondary level is a
function which has been assumed by the states, the local option feature of the
statute, whose operation involved an unreasonable classification, did not save
it. To put it in the language of the court, "when a parish wants to lock its
45. 204 Va. at -,
46.
47.
pool);
48.
49.
50.

51.

133 S.E.2d at 583 (dissenting opinion).

Id. at -, 133 S.E.2d at 579-80.
E.g., Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 276 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1960) (local swvimming
City of Montgomery v. Gilmore, 277 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1960) (local public parks).
322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 375 U.S. 391 (1964).
Id. at 336-37 (dictum).
197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961) (per curiam), aff'd per curiam, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).

197 F. Supp. at 656.
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school doors, the state must turn the key."15 2 It is interesting to note that in
James v. Almond, 53 an early Virginia school closing case, the United States
district court committed itself to a principle similar to that enunciated in Hall:
While the State of Virginia, directly or indirectly, maintains and operates a school
system with the use of public funds, or participates by arrangement or otherwise in
the management of such a school system, no one public school or grade in Virginia
may be closed to avoid the effect of the law of the land as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, while the state permits other public schools or grades to remain
open at the expense of taxpayers. . . .We do not suggest that, aside5 from the
Constitution of Virginia, the state must maintain a public school system. '
In the case under consideration, there were schools being maintained by the
state acting through state agencies and supported partly by state funds, in all
parts of the state except Prince Edward County. The inaction of the county
Board of Supervisors was aimed expressly at avoiding the law of the land as
interpreted by the Supreme Court-the desegregation of the races in a public
school system. Under the rules of Hall and James, such was clearly depriving
the citizens of Prince Edward County of equal protection under the law. Accordingly, the local option device should not be deemed a saving feature and
the closing of the schools does violate the fourteenth amendment.
It is submitted that the closing of the schools in Prince Edward County did
violence to the fourteenth amendment guarantees. While a state may be under
no obligation to provide an education for any of its citizens, where it does, it
must do so for all of them. To allow a state to assume such a responsibility and
then in an area of state action to permit, via a local option device, the abdication
of that responsibility would be to allow a state to avoid its own duty of affording its citizens equal protection under the law. By refusing to recognize the rights
of citizens of Prince Edward County, guaranteed to them under the Constitution, it appears that the instant court has issued "a clear invitation to the federal
courts to step in and enforce such rights." 55
Constitutional Law-Establishment of Religion-Affording an Opportunity for Voluntary Recitation of Prayer in Public School Not a Violation
of the First Amendment.-Students in a New York public school kindergarten
class were precluded by the school's principal from voluntarily reciting certain
52. Id. at 658.
53. 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va.) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 1006 (1959).
This case involved a statute authorizing the Governor of the State to take control of any
public free school or schools which had been desegregated and to close them. The Governor,
acting under this statute, closed several schools in the City of Norfolk after they had been
ordered integrated. The court held the closing to be violative of the fourteenth amendment
since it did not afford equal protection under the law to both white and Negro students
residing in Norfolk, because other schools remained open throughout the state.
54. Id. at 337. See also Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd per
curiam, sub nom. Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959).
55. 204 Va. at -, 133 S.E.2d at 584 (dissenting opinion).
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prayers' each day in their classrooms. The principal's action was upheld by the
New York City Board of Education and the Board of Regents of the State
of New York. Parents of the children brought an action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York to enjoin the school
authorities from interfering with the recitation of the prayers, claiming that
such interference amounted to an unconstitutional prohibition of the free exercise
of religion and an abridgment of the freedom of speech.2 The court granted
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and held, relying on Zorach v.
Clauson,3 that the allowance of voluntary prayer, not pursuant to a state
statute requiring its recitation, did not tend to establish a religion in violation
of the first amendment. Stein v. Oshinsky, 224 F. Supp. 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
Engel v. Vitae 4 declared unconstitutional as an establishment of religion the
recitation in public schools of a "nondenominational," 5 state-composed prayer,
even though participation was voluntary. The Supreme Court stated that the
fact that the prayer was denominationally neutral0 and that observance was on
a voluntary basis did not serve to free it from the limitations of the establishment clause. The clause was violated by the mere enactment of a law which was
religiously motivated.1
Ten years earlier, in Zorack v. Clauson,8 the Court had upheld a New York
City released-time program under which public school children were permitted,
on request of their parents, to leave the school grounds once a week in order to
obtain religious instruction. The program involved neither the use of public
1. The two prayers involved were:
"God is Great, God is Good
And we thank Him for our Food, Amen," and
"Thank You for the World So Sweet
Thank You for the food we eat
Thank You for the birds that sing
Thank You God for everything."
Stein v. Oshinsky, 224 F. Supp. 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise therof; or abridging the freedom of speech ... ." U.S. Const. amend. I.
3. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
4. 370 U.S. 421 (1962), 31 Fordham L. Rev. 201. See also Kauper, Prayer, Public
Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1031 (1963); Sutherland, Establishment
of Religion According to Engel, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 25 (1962); 27 Albany L. Rev. 119
(1963); 46 Marq. L. Rev. 233 (1962).

5. Some have questioned whether the term "nondenominational prayer" isa contradiction interms. Ithas been suggested that several nontheistic and polytheistic "religions"
could not ascribe to the Regents' prayer. Cahn, On Government and Prayer, 37 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 981, 991-94 (1962).
6. See note 5 supra.
7. "From the Supreme Court's opinion one fact emerged clearly: the Court read the
establishment clause as-Congress shall make no laws respecting religion. It actually
deleted the concept of 'establishment' from its reasoning." 31 Fordham L. Rev. 201, 205
(1962). (Italics omitted.)
8. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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facilities for religious purposes 9 nor the expenditure of public funds to this
end. The Court held that school boards may constitutionally make "adjust10
ments of their schedules to accommodate the religious needs of the people."
There was, in the present case, no affirmative imposition of a state-composed,
or even state-sanctioned, prayer or religious observance. It therefore escaped
the Engel indictment that "government ... should stay out of the business of
11 In fact, there was here not only
writing or sanctioning official prayers ....
an absence of affirmative aid to religion, but an absence of state law altogetheraffirmative or negative-relative to the voluntary recitation of prayer. Thus
the court found a reasonable enough precedent in Zorach's "accommodation"
doctrine.
Can it be argued, however, that Engel has, sub silentio, overruled Zorach?
It appears that, under Engel's interpretation of the establishment clause, a
state would be prohibited from enacting any law (and a state agency would be
prohibited from taking any official action) the purpose of which would be to
accommodate the public service to the spiritual needs of some, or all, of the
people.' 2 It is clear that an overruling of Zorach was not required under the
facts of Engel, but the Engel reasoning is difficult to reconcile with Zorach.
A reconciliation of the two cases was suggested by Mr. Justice Brennan in
his concurring opinion in School Dist. v. Schempp,13 in which the Court held
unconstitutional the state-sanctioned reading of the Bible and recitation of the
Lord's Prayer in public schools.' 4 Mr. Justice Brennan interpreted the establishment clause as allowing, even after Engel, "involvements of religious with
secular institutions"'15 in cases concerning: (1) a conflict between the establishment clause and the free exercise clause of the first amendment; (2) invocational prayers in legislative bodies; (3) the use of religious documents or
practices for legitimate secular purposes; (4) tax exemptions for religious in9. In McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), the Court held that a ruling
by an Illinois board of education which permitted teachers from any religious group
(subject to the approval of the superintendent of schools) to use public school facilities
for the purpose of giving religious instruction to those children whose parents requested
it, violated the establishment clause.
10. 343 U.S. at 315. (Emphasis added.)
11. 370 U.S. at 435. (Emphasis added.) Note that although the prayers involved in the
instant case, if sanctioned by the school, were sanctioned only in the negative sensethey were not forbidden. They were not official in any sense of the term.
12. See note 7 supra.
13. 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (concurring opinion).
14. Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the Court, distinguished Zorach v. Clauson from the
facts of the cases at bar as follows: "Applying the Establishment Clause principles to the
cases at bar we find that the States are requiring . . . these exercises . . . as part of the
curricular activities of students who are required by law to attend school. They are held
in the school buildings under the supervision and with the participation of teachers employed in those schools. None of these factors, other than compulsory school attendance,
was present in the program upheld in Zorach v. Clauson." 374 U.S. at 223. (Italics
omitted.)
I1. Id. at 295.
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stitutions;
and (5) patriotic exercises which have lost their religious connota16
tion.
Under this reasoning, then, Zorach would appear to support the instant decision only if it could be shown that the denial by the school of the opportunity
for reciting these prayers constituted a violation of the free exercise clause. 17
Again, a reading of Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Schempp indicates that this would not amount to an interference with plaintiffs' freedom
of religion. In distinguishing between the constitutionality of accommodating
chaplains in penal institutions and the armed services, and the sponsorship of
religious exercises in public schools, he stated that "the student's compelled
presence in school for five days a week in no way renders the regular religious
facilities of the community less accessible to him than they are to others. The
situation of the school child is therefore plainly unlike that of the isolated
soldier or the prisoner."18
Further, the recital of prayer, assuming a majority of the students participate, would, perhaps, subject those unwilling to pray to the "suspicion or
obloquy" of their peers, "by requiring what is tantamount in the eyes of
teachers and schoolmates to a profession of disbelief, or at least of nonconformity ... Y,19 In this regard, it would seem irrelevant that the prayers were
not composed by the State, so long as they were sanctioned by the school, a
state agency.
The question also remains whether the original rule of Zorach v. Clauson
was properly applied by the present court. Does not the present decision turn
the permission, given by Zorach, to the state to accommodate religion into a
requirement that the state do so in all cases not prohibited by the establish20
ment clause? The Supreme Court has yet to take that position.

Equity--Constructive Trust Will Not Be Imposed Upon Real Property
Where Defendant Fraudulently Breached Oral Promise To Advance
Money for Its Purchase and Purchased It for Himself.-Plaintiff executed
a written contract to purchase real property from the Republic of Haiti for
240,000 dollars and made a 10,000 dollar downpayment. Before the dosing
date she offered to resell the property to defendants, upon their oral promise
to advance the money for the closing and thereafter buy the land for 278,000
dollars. As a result of defendants' failure to advance the money, plaintiff was
16. Id. at 296-304.
17. If so, it would amount to a preference of irreligion over religion-the converse of
dictum in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), to the effect that a preference of
religion over irreligion is violative of the establishment clause. There is also dictum in
Everson proscribing discrimination by reason of religion or the lack of it. Id. at 16.
18. 374 U.S. at 299.
19. Id. at 289.
20. Cf. Mr. justice Brennan's language in Schempp: "I do not say that government
must provide chaplains or draft exemptions, or that the courts should intercede if it fails to
do so." Id. at 299. (Italics omitted.)
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unable to close title, and defendants subsequently bought the land from the
vendor for 243,000 dollars. In a suit to impose a constructive trust on the
property in her favor, plaintiff alleged that defendants had never intended
to carry out their oral promise, and that defendants made their promises to
plaintiff to prevent her from closing with other possible purchasers and to
enable them to buy the property themselves at a substantial profit. On appeal
from a denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment,' the appellate
division held 2 that plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought, since even
if defendants had performed their oral promise, they, not plaintiff, would have
been left with legal title. 3 Chief Judge Desmond, one of three dissenters from
a memorandum affirmance by the New York Court of Appeals, adopted the
position that a constructive trust should have been imposed, finding it to be
the only remedy which would redress the harm done to the plaintiff by the
actual fraud of the defendants, and that a confidential relationship between
the parties, which is ordinarily required to obtain this relief, need be shown
only where the facts are insufficient to sustain a finding of actual fraud.
Sutton v. Sandler, 13 N.Y.2d 1007, 195 N.E.2d 303, 245 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1963)
(memorandum decision).
The constructive trust is recognized, particularly in the United States, as
an equitable remedy of extensive scope. 4 Several commentators have attempted
to clarify the concept by categorizing the varied situations in which constructive trusts have been decreed.5 In practice, the remedy has been employed
7
to prevent unjust enrichment resulting from fraud,( misrepresentation, un0
9
8
due influence, duress, mistake' and crime." In the absence of actual
1. Sutton v. Sandier, 36 Misc. 2d 480, 231 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
2. Sutton v. Sandler, 18 App. Div. 2d 362, 239 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem.,
13 N.Y.2d 1007, 195 N.E.2d 303, 245 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1963).
3. "Consequently the equitable maxim that equity regards as done what ought to have
been done . . . has no application." Id. at 363, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
4. Scott, Constructive Trusts, 71 L.Q. Rev. 39 (1955). It is also referred to as a trust
"ex maleficio," trust "ex delicto," trust "in invitum," or "involuntary" trust. Bogert, Trusts
and Trustees § 471 (2d ed. 1960).
5. See Costigan, Constructive Trusts Based on Promises Made to Secure Bequests,
Devises, or Intestate Succession, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 237 (1915); Costigan, The Classification
of Trusts as Express, Resulting, and Constructive, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (1914); Scott,
Conveyances Upon Trusts Not Properly Declared, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 653 (1924).
6. E.g., Pink v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 274 N.Y. 167, 8 N.E.2d 321 (1937); Faik
v. Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199, 135 N.E. 243 (1922); Stephens v. Evans, 190 Misc. 922, 75
N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
7. E.g., Lloyd v. Phillips, 272 App. Div. 222, 71 N.Y.S.2d 103 (4th Dep't 1947).
8. E.g., Latham v. Father Divine, 299 N.Y. 22, 85 N.E.2d 168 (1949) (constructive
trust decreed where deceased was prevented by defendants from changing her will);
Mullin v. Mullin, 119 App. Div. 521, 104 N.Y. Supp. 323 (2d Dep't 1907).
9. See Bogert, op. cit. supra note 4, § 474.
10. E.g., Lamb v. Schiefner, 129 App. Div. 684, 114 N.Y. Supp. 34 (2d Dep't 1908);
Scott v. Freedom Development Corp., 219 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (conveyance Included more land than that to which grantee was entitled).
11. See Bogert, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 476-78. A constructive trust may be imposed
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fraud, -2 it has been decreed where there has been a breach of a confidential or fiduciary relationship, referred to by the courts as constructive fraud. 13 Constructive
trusts imposed on these grounds are common in cases where there has been
a refusal to reconvey by one who has received a deed on oral trust, or on an
oral or implied promise to hold for the grantor1 4 and reconvey to him or some
third person 15 upon the grantor's direction. However, it is not the mere violation of or refusal to perform the oral agreement which will "put the court
in motion" to impress a constructive trust.'0 The confidential relationship
itself must have been the inducement for the conveyance which resulted in
unjust enrichment. 17 It has also been generally recognized that the Statute of
Frauds is no defense to such an action brought for breach of an oral agreement to reconvey, where the transfer has been procured through fraud, duress
conveyed to one who occupies
or undue influence, or where the land has been
8
a confidential relationship to the transferor.'
Actual fraud alone has been held to support the imposition of a constructive trust where the fraud had been committed against one who would otherwise have acquired or retained title. Thus, where a conveyance is obtained
through intentionally false statements as to material facts, such as falsely
representing oneself as the agent of another,'0 or representing that a deed is
on property or proceeds of property obtained through larceny, embezzlement, forgery
or murder.
12. E.g., Pink v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 274 N.Y. 167, 8 N.E.2d 321 (1937); Randolph
v. Randolph, 28 Misc. 2d 66, 212 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (interest in real property
obtained by fraud through an invalid marriage).
13. See Farano v. Stephanelli, 7 App. Div. 2d 420, 424, 183 N.Y.S.2d 707, 711 (Ist Dep't
1959); Frick v. Cone, 160 Misc. 450, 458, 290 N.Y.S. 592, 601 (Sup. CL 1936), aff'd
mem., 251 App. Div. 781, 298 N.Y.S. 173 (4th Dep't 1937).
14. E.g., Foreman v. Foreman, 251 N.Y. 237, 167 N.E. 428 (1929) (property inherited
from mother held on oral trust for father) ; Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N.Y. 245, 139 N.E. 2S5
(1923) (deed held in trust by sister for brother); Mogia v. Clark, 256 App. Div. 847,
9 N.Y.S.2d 413 (2d Dep't 1939) (memorandum decision) (oral promise of daughter to
hold in trust for father). Cf. Fraw Realty Co. v. Natanson, 261 N.Y. 396, 185 N.E. 679
(1933).
15. E.g., Moyer v. Moyer, 21 Hun 67 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1880) (deed held on oral
trust by son for other children). Cf. Oursler v. Armstrong, 8 App. Div. 2d 194, 186
N.Y.S.2d 829 (1st Dep't 1959), rev'd, 10 N.Y.2d 385, 179 N.E.2d 489, 223 N.Y.S.2d 477
(1961).
16. Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N.Y. 245, 253, 139 N.E. 255, 258 (1923).
17. Farano v. Stephanelli, 7 App. Div. 2d 420, 424, 183 N.Y.S.2d 707, 711 (1st Dep't
1959). See also Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 145 N.Y. 313, 318, 39 N.E. 1067, 1068 (1895);
Wood v. Rabe, 96 N.Y. 414, 426 (1884); Hifler v. Calmac Oil & Gas Corp., 10 N.Y.S.2d
531, aff'd mer., 258 App. Div. 78, 16 N.YS.2d 104 (4th Dep't 1939).
18. 1 Scott, Trusts § 44, at 313 (2d ed. 1956). See Comment, The Confidential Relationship Theory of Constructive Trusts-An Exception to the Statute of Frauds, 29
Fordham L. Rev. 561 (1961).
19. Lloyd v. Phillips, 272 App. Div. 222, 71 N.Y.S.2d 103 (4th Dep't 1947).
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a power of attorney, or that the grantee is unmarried, a court of equity
will grant relief.
The constructive trust remedy, as defined in the Restatement of Restitution,22 has three elements: (1) the holding of legal title by the one against
whom the constructive trust is to be imposed; (2) an equitable duty on his
part to convey to another; (3) unjust enrichment if title be retained by him.
The first element was satisfied in the instant case since the defendants held
legal title. The appellate division answered the inquiry as to the second element
by stating that since "equity regards as done that which ought to be done,"
defendants were under no equitable duty to convey to the plaintiff. Had their
alleged oral agreement been28carried out, title to the property would eventually
have vested in defendants.
If the defendants here had agreed to purchase the property with money
advanced by the plaintiff, and to reconvey it to her, a constructive trust could
have been decreed upon defendants' refusal to reconvey. 24 Both unjust enrichment and a fiduciary relationship of principal and agent 25 would have existed.
The power of a court of equity to order this relief in the case of land purchased with stolen funds would also support the decree.20
However, no case has been found wherein the party in whose favor a trust is
imposed would not, had there been no-wrongdoing on the part of the defendant,
have ultimately received or kept possession of the property. On the contrary,
relief has been denied to plaintiffs who asked that a constructive trust be
impressed on the proceeds of an insurance claim. The court reasoned that
it was not the insurance claim which the defendants wrongfully obtained from
the plaintiffs.2 7 The plaintiffs never had any "proprietary" or "possessory"
rights in it. The court stated that "the purpose of impressing a constructive
trust on specific property is to put the parties in status quo and prevent
'28
unjust enrichment.
Similarly, in the instant case, the plaintiff had been the victim of an alleged
fraud, but the property upon which she sought to have the court impress the
constructive trust was not the property of which she was defrauded. She was
20. Kahm v. Klaus, 64 Kan. 24, 67 Pac. 542 (1902).
21. Davis v. Cummins, 195 S.W. 752 (Mo. 1917). A constructive trust was decreed
in favor of a woman defrauded of her property through marriage to one who did not
disclose a prior existing marriage. In an action involving the heirs of each, her heirs
prevailed.
22. Restatement, Restitution § 160 (1937). See also Restatement (Second), Trusts § 1,
comment e (1959).
23.

18 App. Div. 2d at 363, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 390-91.

24. See Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 487, at 167-68 (2d ed. 1960).
25. Ibid. See also 1 Scott, Trusts § 2.5, at 38 (2d ed. 1956).
26. See Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 476 (2d ed. 1960); 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§ 1058b-c (5th ed. 1941).
27.

California Airparts Corp. v. Rubino, 21 Misc. 2d 490, 192 N.Y.S.2d 180 (Sup.

Ct. 1959).
28. Id. at 493, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 185, citing Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 236, 120
N.E. 639, 640 (1918).

1964]

CASE NOTES

defrauded of her expected profit. Since the defendants paid for the property
with their own funds, it is difficult to argue that they were unjustly enriched
merely by virtue of their retention of the property. Thus, since the second
and third conditions2 9 for the exercise of equity's power were not met, the
constructive trust must fail.
The effect of the Statute of Frauds upon equity's discretion to grant this
relief must also be considered. Generally, a misrepresentation as to one's intentions to carry out an oral agreement which the Statute of Frauds requires to
be in writing is not such an actual fraud as will move a court of equity to
act.30 An exception to this rule exists where there is a confidential relationship 3'
or an attempt to create a trust by a deed given on an oral promise to reconvey. 2 Neither was present in the instant case. If the contract had been
written, any fraud by way of misrepresentation of present intention would
have presented no problem, since the written contract could be specifically
enforced. Equity will not extend a remedy to one who has neglected to use
the safeguards that the law demands. 33
Whether, on the other hand, plaintiff had an adequate legal remedy can be
better determined if the alleged oral agreement is considered as two separate
contracts: (1) an oral contract by which defendants were to advance money
to plaintiff, for which plaintiff's forbearance in selling to other prospective
purchasers was adequate consideration; and (2) an oral agreement for the
sale of the property by plaintiff to defendants. The oral contract for sale
should not be considered because it is unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds, 34 and since defendants held title, the intent of the parties had been
carried out. However, the plaintiff appears to have had a cause of action for
damages resulting from defendants' failure to advance the money. In addition,
the plaintiff could have based her claim on a theory of tortious interference
with contract and prospective advantage. The defendants allegedly were
aware that the plaintiff had a contract with the original vendor of the real
property and that she had received offers from other prospective purchasers.
Dean Prosser lists among the "expectancies" protected from interference with
prospective advantage 5 the opportunity of obtaining customers where there is
some background of business experience on the basis of which it is possible to
estimate with a fair amount of accuracy both the value of what was lost and
the likelihood that the plaintiff would have received it if the defendant had
not interfered. Damages in this situation are commonly awarded on the basis
of lost profits. 6 Finally, if the allegations of the plaintiff were true, actual
29. See authorities cited note 22 supra.
30. Hunt v. Hunt, 171 N.Y. 396, 402, 64 N.E. 159, 160 (1902); Dung v. Parke', 52
N.Y. 494, 500 (1873).
31. Grote v. Grote, 121 App. Div. 841, 106 N.Y. Supp. 986 (Ist Dep't 1907).
32. See Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 496, at 243 (2d ed. 1960).
33. 2 Pomeroy, Equity jurisprudence § 425, at 189-90 (5th ed. 1941).
34. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 259.
35. See Prosser, Torts § 107, at 746-47 (2d ed. 1955).
36. Id. at 747 & n.62. See McCormick, Damages § 30 (1935).
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fraud existed by reason of defendants' misrepresentations as to their intentions
to advance money. This, from the reasoning of Channel Master Corp. v.
Aluminum Ltd. Sales, Inc., 37 is sufficient to state a cause of action in tort for
fraud and deceit. In Channel Master the plaintiff corporation, which required
a dependable supply of aluminum (rather than money) in large quantity,
charged that the defendant falsely represented that it was capable of meeting
a specified monthly requirement and that it had not entered binding commitments with other customers. The plaintiff, relying on such representations, refrained from securing commitments for future supplies from others (as the
plaintiff in the instant case refrained from obtaining other purchasers to advance
the money) and was thereby injured in its business. The court held that it was
sufficient to show that the defendant knowingly uttered a falsehood intending
to deprive the plaintiff of a benefit and that the plaintiff was thereby deceived
and damaged. Furthermore, since the action was in tort, depending not upon
agreement, but rather on misrepresentation of fact relied on by the plaintiff to
its detriment, the court held that the Statute of Frauds was no defense:
If the proof of a promise or contract, void under the statute of frauds, is essential to
maintain the action, there may be no recovery, but, on the other hand, one who
agreement is subject
fraudulently misrepresents himself as intending to perform an
8
to liability in tort whether the agreement is enforcible or not.3
Whether the New York Court of Appeals will extend the holding in Channel
Master to cover real property cases falling within the Statute of Frauds is
questionable. The Channel Master rationale was applied in Terris v. Cummiskey,39 where a purchaser recovered from the builder of a house who had
fraudulently induced the purchaser to enter a contract for construction and
sale by falsely representing his intentions and ability to build a dry cellar in
the house. However, the contract was not oral and was substantially performed,
and the misrepresentation primarily concerned ability to perform, rather than
intention. The reasons for applying a tort theory in Channel Master and the
instant case are nonetheless the same, 40 since allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation of intention to perform were present in both cases. Thus, the
plaintiff here appears to have had an adequate remedy 4' at law if her allegations could be proved.
37. 4 N.Y.2d 403, 151 N.E.2d 833, 176 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1958).
38. Id. at 408, 151 N.E.2d at 836, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
39. 11 App. Div. 2d 259, 203 N.Y.S.2d 445 (3d Dep't 1960).
40. See Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 473 (1960) for a criticism of the
Channel Master decision. But see Rohan, The Common Law Tradition: Situation Sense,
Subjectivism or "Just-Result Jurisprudence"?, 32 Fordham L. Rev. 51, 59 (1963).
41. See generally Comment, Must the Remedy at Law Be Inadequate Before a Constructive Trust Will Be Impressed?, 25 St. John's L. Rev. 283 (1951).
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Full Faith and Credit-Action To Quiet Title-Nebraska Decision That
It Had Jurisdiction Over Land Under the Missouri River Held Res Judicata on the Courts of Missouri as Between the Private Party Litigants.Petitioners, Nebraska residents, brought an action in a Nebraska court to
quiet title to bottom land situated under the Missouri River. Respondent, a
Missouri resident, appeared and fully litigated the question of jurisdiction, the
issue being whether the land remained in Nebraska after a change in the river's
course.' A finding for petitioners was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Nebraska. 2 Respondent subsequently filed suit in a Missouri court to quiet title
to the same land. The suit was removed to a federal district court, which held
that the Nebraska judgment was binding on the courts of Missouri.3 The court
of appeals reversed, reasoning that the Nebraska judgment could not bind
Missouri on the question of Nebraska's jurisdiction over the subject matter of
this particular suit. 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
the doctrine of full faith and credit applies to cases involving jurisdiction over
real property. 5 That Court reversed and held that the parties to the action could
not retry the question of jurisdiction in Missouri since the issue had already
been settled between them in Nebraska. Durjee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
The Constitution provides that each state shall give full faith and credit to
the judicial proceedings of every other state.0 This provision, which extends
to federal courts, 7 has been so broadly interpreted as to "become a part of
national jurisprudence . . . ."8 Although there are some exceptions to this
doctrine,9 the Supreme Court has made it quite clear that the occasions for
1. A court has no jurisdiction to affect land directly that is not within its jurisdiction.
In Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891), the issue was whether the courts of New
York could pass judgment on real estate in Tennessee. The Court commented: "To declare
the deed . . . null and void, in virtue alone of the decree in New York, would be to
attribute to that decree the force and effect of a judgment in rem by a court having no
jurisdiction over the res." Id. at 106. (Italics omitted.) See also Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S.
1 (1909); accord, Deschenes v. Tallman, 248 N.Y. 33, 161 N.E. 321 (1928).
2. Durfee v. Keiffer, 168 Neb. 272, 95 N.W.2d 618 (1959).
3. Duke v. Durfee, 215 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mo. 1961).
4. Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962). The court commented that although
Missouri was not prevented from bringing an action in the future, "we are inclined to
feel that the courts of a state which is directly and adversely affected by the first forum's
determination in its state's favor of the situs of land as between the two states should be
able properly to inquire into the jurisdictional grounds . . . ." Id. at 220.
5. Durfee v. Duke, 371 U.S. 946 (1963).
6. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958). See Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938).
8. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942).
9. A state, for instance, need not give full faith and credit to a judgment which violates
the due process clause. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 232 (1946) ("Since by virtue of the
due process clause the judgment is ineffective in New York to adjudicate petitioner's rights
.. . it cannot be made the instrument for enforcing elsewhere the obligation ...

").

The

same result follows when the original cause is dismissed on the basis of the statute of

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

granting such exceptions are rare. 10
In 1945, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. North Carolina (II)," and

held that a state's jurisdiction over the subject matter of an ex parte divorce
action could be challenged in a subsequent proceeding outside the state. 12 Subsequently, Sherrer v. Sherrer,13 a case in which both parties had appeared in

the original action, limited Williams to situations where there had been no

opportunity to litigate the question of jurisdiction.' 4 Both cases involved divorce
proceedings and out-of-state jurisdiction over the marital res.
There is a direct analogy between the instant case and Sherrer. Here both
parties appeared in Nebraska and there was full opportunity to litigate the

question of jurisdiction. Unless there be some distinguishing factor between
jurisdiction over a marital res and jurisdiction over real property, there can be
no question that Nebraska's decision was binding in Missouri as to the rights
of the parties. The respondent argued here that Missouri would not be bound
because a state has far more interest in a tract of real property than it does in
a marital res. This assertion is not free from doubt;1 nonetheless, even if
limitations. Stokke v. Southern Pac. Co., 169 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1948). Nor need a state
be bound by an out-of-state decision based on the penal laws of the other state. Wisconsin
v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888) (dictum); Huntington v. Attrlll, 146 U.S. 657,
675-76 (1892) (dictum); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 102, 120 N.E. 198
(1918) ("'The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.' ") (dictum). In
some situations it appears that states might be exempted from recognizing a foreign decree
on the ground that it was in conflict with the public policy of the state in which the
collateral action was brought. See In re Lorok, 93 Ohio App. 251, 269, 114 N.E.2d 65,
74 (1952) (dictum); Earle v. Earle, 141 App. Div. 611, 126 N.Y. Supp. 317 (1st Dep't
1910); Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935) (by implication).
Similar exemptions have been allowed when the party could show he never in fact appeared
in the original action, Hall v. Lanning, 91 U.S. 160 (1875), or when the original decision
was in contravention of federal pre-emption, Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940), or
of sovereign immunity, Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919) (by Implication).
10. See Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942). The Court commented:
"[T]his Court has been reluctant to admit exceptions in case of judgments rendered by the
courts of a sister state, since the 'very purpose' of Art. IV, § 1 was 'to alter the status of
the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations
created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them
integral parts of a single nation.'" Id. at 295. (Italics omitted.)
11. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
12. Id. at 230.
13. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
14. Id. at 355-56. "It is one thing to recognize as permissible the judicial reexamination
of findings of jurisdictional fact where such findings have been made by a court of a sister
State which has entered a divorce decree in ex parte proceedings. It is quite another to hold
that the vital rights . . . may be held in suspense pending the scrutiny by courts of sister
States of findings of jurisdictional fact made by a competent court in proceedings . . . In
which the defendant has participated." (Italics and footnote omitted.)
15. A state has a vital interest in "the marital status, . . . [the] protection of off-spring,
property interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities . . . ." 317 U.S. at 298.
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respondent were to carry the point that the state has a greater interest in real
property, the question remains whether that interest is superior to interests
served by the doctrine of res judicata. The Court said in Sherrer that the fact
that "vital interests are involved in... litigation indicates to us that it is a
matter of greater rather than lesser importance that there should be a place to

end such litigation."'

6

Accepting this rationale, how can one disagree with the

present Court's finding that "no . . . overriding considerations are present

here,"' 7 particularly in light of the Court's holding that only the parties themselves were bound by the Nebraska decision? The Court made it clear that the
Nebraska determination would not be binding on the state of Missouri should
ownership of the land later be disputed by those states."'
Mr. Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, expressly reserved judgment
on the question of whether the parties to the instant case would continue to be
bound if Missouri were to bring a successful action to determine jurisdiction or
if the two states signed an interstate compact giving Missouri jurisdiction.10
The reservation appears to be in contravention of the policy expressed in
Land v. Dollar.20 In that case petitioners claimed that certain stock was being
illegally held and offered for sale by the maritime commission. They brought
suit against the individual members of the commission. In dicta, the Supreme
Court stated that the original court's decision, although not binding on the
United States, would be final as to the litigants.2 1 Further, since the instant
case is an outgrowth of Sherrer, the ensuing extension of the entire effect of
that decision would preclude the reservation of Mr. Jnstice Black. The cases
following Sherrer held that a party with no standing in the original forum
could not collaterally attack the decision outside the forum.22 Following that
16. 334 U.S. at 356.
17. 375 U.S. at 114.
18. The Court commented: "Nothing there decided, and nothing that could be decided
in litigation between the same parties or their privies in Missouri, could bind either
Missouri or Nebraska with respect to any controversy they might have, now or in the
future, as to the location of the boundary between them ....
" Id. at 115. See Land v.
Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 736-37 (1947).
19. "[W]e are not deciding the question whether the respondent would continue to be
bound by the Nebraska judgment should it later be authoritatively decided, either in an
original proceeding between the States in this Court or by a compact between the two
States under Art. I, § 10, that the disputed tract is in Missouri." 375 US. at 117. See
Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 736-37 (1947).
20. 330 US. 731 (1947).
21. Id. at 736-37. The Court noted in reference to United States v. Lee, 106 US. 196
(1882): "Though the judgment was not res judicata against the United States ... it settled
as between the parties the controversy over possession." Id. at 737. (Italics omitted.)
22. In Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951), the Supreme Court held that a
Florida divorce can not be challenged outside Florida by a third party who would not
have standing to attack the divorce collaterally in Florida. The present decision could not
prevent Missouri from suing Nebraska; yet, if Missouri did not have standing in Nebraska
to attack the holding collaterally, it could not do so outside Nebraska.
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rationale, a subsequent successful action by Missouri against Nebraska or an
interstate compact favoring the state of Missouri, although altering rights
and duties as between third parties, would not affect the litigants in the instant
case. The sole effect of subsequent action of either nature on the parties would
be that petitioners would then own land located in Missouri rather than
Nebraska. Mr. Justice Black's reservation would be pertinent only if Nebraska
agreed to re-open decisions affected by an interstate compact or a successful
action brought by Missouri. This chain of results seems a remote possibility,
and is at best a weak reason for such a reservation.

Practice and Procedure-New Jersey "Abandons" Immunity From Process
Traditionally Awarded to Nonresidents Attending Judicial Proceedings.
-Defendant, a New York resident, was executor and a beneficiary of a New
Jersey estate. In conformance with New Jersey law, he filed a power of attorney
with the surrogate, appointing him agent for the acceptance of process affecting
the estate. Plaintiff commenced an action against the estate and defendant
appeared in response to a summons served on the surrogate. While in the state
for that purpose, defendant was personally served with process initiating an
action against him in his individual capacity. Respondent's motion to quash
the service on the grounds that he was a nonresident attending court proceedings, and therefore immune from service, was granted by the trial court. Plaintiff
appealed to the superior court, appellate division, and the supreme court,
certifying the question on its own motion, reversed the trial court. It held, in a
5-to-2 decision, that defendant was not immune from service. The court stated
that "the doctrine of immunity moves in a direction wholly inconsistent with
today's concept of justice"' and suggested that the doctrine of immunity be
replaced by the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Wangler
v. Harvey, 41 N.J. 277, 196 A.2d 513 (1963), petition for rehearing denied, No.
4260, Sup. Ct., Jan. 15, 1964.
The immunity afforded nonresidents from service of process while voluntarily "going to, staying at, or returning from"2 another judicial proceeding was
recognized in New Jersey in the case of Halsey v. Stewart.3
1. Wangler v. Harvey, 41 N.J. 277, 285, 196 A.2d 513, 517 (1963).
2. 4 N.J.L. 366, 367 (Sup. Ct. 1817).
3. 4 N.J.L. 366 (Sup. Ct. 1817). Defendant, a nonresident, was served while in Ncw
Jersey for the prosecution of a case in which he was a party. The court held him immune
from service because to hold otherwise would discourage nonresidents from attending
judicial proceedings, leave the courts inaccessible to some, and interrupt the judicial
proceeding.
There is an earlier New Jersey case on record, Rogers v. Bullock, 3 N.JL. 516 (Sup.
Ct. 1809), discussing immunity, but that was a case of statutory immunity granted to
residents when served with subpoena to appear in another county. It was discounted as
being authority for nonresidents in Dungan v. Miller, 37 N.J.L. 182 (Sup. Ct. 1874) and
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The doctrine of Halsey has been applied to plaintiffs, 4 defendants 5 and witnesses.6 Immunity, aside from the situation where a nonresident is served while
defending a suit,7 has been granted to a defendant at a hearing,8 a plaintiff in
a summary proceeding,9 a witness before a court commissioner' 0 or before a
master in chancery. 11 It has been applied to a defendant answering a summons
issuing from a police court' 2 and a witness who appeared in a representative
capacity.' 3 The doctrine was extended in Riewold v. Riewold14 to protect a
nonresident witness who was giving testimony before a notary public concerning
a case in another state.
Conversely, immunity was denied where the individual claiming it was found
Jones v. Knauss, 31 NJ. Eq. 211 (Ch. 1879). In the case of nonresidents, a voluntary
appearance is necessary.
See also Michaelson v. Goldfarb, 94 N.J.L. 352, 110 Ad. 710 (Sup. CL 1920), where
it was held that it "is thoroughly settled in this state by a line of cases beginning with
Halsey v. Stewart . . .that a party to a suit while necessarily going to, staying at, or
returning from the court, is equally privileged from the service of a summons or of a
capias in a dvil action." Id. at 352, 110 Ad. at 710. (Emphasis omitted.)
4. Richardson v. Smith, 74 N.J.L. 111, 65 At. 162 (Sup. Ct. 1906).
5. Younger v. Younger, 5 N.J. Super. 371, 69 A.2d 219 (App. Div. 1949); Herman v.
Arndt, 116 N.J.L. 150, 182 At. 830 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936); Michaelson v. Goldfarb, 94
N.J.L. 352, 110 Ad. 710 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Dungan v. Miller, 37 N.J.L. 182 (Sup. CL 1874);
Cook v. Cook, 132 N.J. Eq. 352, 28 A.2d 178 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942); Golde v. Golde,
108 N.J. Eq. 519, 155 AtI. 677 (Ch. 1931); Prescott v. Prescott, 95 N.J. Eq. 173, 122 AU.
611 (Ch. 1923); Allen v. Plowman, 14 N.J. Misc. 251, 183 Ad. 899 (Dist. Ct. 1936)
(dictum).
6.

Randall v. Randall, 14 N.J. Super. 110, 81 A.2d 400 (Ch. 1951); Mulhearn v. Press

Publishing Co., 53 NJ.L. 153, 21 Ad. 186 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Riewold v. Riewold, 121
N.J. Eq. 134, 188 AUI. 72 (Ch. 1936); Brown v. Brown, 112 N.J. Eq. 600, 601-02, 165 AU.
643, 644 (Ch. 1933) (dictum); Jones v. Knauss, 31 N.J. Eq. 211 (Ch. 1879). Cf. N.J. Rev.
Stat. § 2A:81-21 (1951), granting immunity from civil or criminal process in a matter which
arose prior to entrance, to a person who voluntarily enters the state in obedience to a
summons to testify in a criminal proceeding.
7. Younger v. Younger, 5 N.J. Super. 371, 69 A.2d 219 (App. Div. 1949).
8. Herman v. Arndt, 116 N.J.L. 150, 182 AU. 830 (CL Err. & App. 1936).
9. Richardson v. Smith, 74 N.J.L. 111, 65 Ad. 162 (Sup. Ct. 1906).
10. Mulhearn v. Press Publishing Co., 53 N.J.L. 153, 21 Ad. 186 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
11. Dungan v. Miller, 37 N.J.L. 182 (Sup. Ct. 1874).
12. Allen v. Plowman, 14 N.J. Misc. 251, 183 Atl. 899 (Dist. Ct. 1936) (dictum).
13. Mulhearn v. Press Publishing Co., 53 N.J.L. 153, 21 Atl. 186 (Sup. CL 1890). A
vice-president appeared as a representative of a corporation and, while still in the State,
was served with process in his representative capacity.
14. 121 N.J. Eq. 134, 188 AU. 72 (Ch. 1936). Cf. Morgan v. Morgan, 15 N.J. Misc.
101, 188 At. 258 (Ch. 1936), aff'd, 122 N.J. Eq. 2, 192 Ad. 508 (CL Err. & App. 1937),
where the court said in dictum that it would not apply immunity to a nonresident who
entered the state to confer with his wife's attorney at the unofficial suggestion of the
prosecutor.
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to have perpetrated a fraud on the court,' 5 or where his entrance into the state
was not voluntary."The instant case is not the first in recent years to affect the doctrine of
Halsey. In Korff v. G & G Corp.,'7 the court held that nonresidents who
invoke the aid of the New Jersey courts cannot claim immunity when subjected
to cross-actions in the same suit. Grober v. Kahn,'8 relying on and expanding
Korf, subjected the nonresident plaintiff to process in a suit arising out of the
same set of facts where the nonresident plaintiff simply utilized New Jersey
judicial facilities to take a deposition before a New Jersey commissioner. Thus,
while Korti stated that the cases had to be connected in form, Grober stated that
it was enough that they be connected in substance. Both cases, however, involved
situations where the nonresident was the proponent in a cause of action, and the
factual situations were similar.
Although the court cited Korf] and Grober as authority for limiting the doctrine of Halsey, it did not connect the holdings. It discussed neither parties nor
factual situations-the grounds of the Korff and Grober decisions-but merely
denied immunity and advocated the doctrine of forum non conveniens as an
adequate substitute. Justice Proctor, concurring, felt that immunity should be
denied for the additional reason that "withholding immunity . . . is consistent
with our firm commitment to the enlightened policy that just and expeditious
15.
16.

Baskerville v. Kofsky, 18 N.J. Misc. 325, 13 A.2d 562 (C.P. 1940).
See Rutledge v. Krauss, 73 N.J.L. 397, 63 AtI. 988 (Sup. Ct. 1906). The court held

that the coming into the state "as a fugitive from justice under extradition is not to be considered in the same light as the voluntary coming into our state . . . ." Id. at 399, 63 Ati.
at 989. The immunity was granted in Golde v. Golde, 108 N.J. Eq. 519, 155 Ad. 677
(Ch. 1931), where defendant waived extradition. Cf. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:160-34 (1951),
granting immunity from civil process arising out of the same set of facts to a person who
waives extradition on a criminal charge, either until after conviction or, if acquitted, until
he has time to return to the state from which he came.
Immunity has been granted in one type of involuntary appearance. The courts have
termed an appearance induced through trickery as "involuntary," but, in light of the
equities involved, have granted immunity. Williams v. Reed, 29 N.J.L. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1862).
17. 21 N.J. 558, 122 A.2d 889 (1956). Plaintiffs, creditors of defendant, had a receiver

appointed on the grounds of misuse of company funds. The Penneys brothers filed a claim
with the receiver. Defendant's president had also diverted some of her son's money, and
a guardian was appointed to protect his interests. The guardian discovered that the money
had been diverted to the brothers and filed a counterclaim against them through the
defendant, and a cross-action against their company after having it joined as a defendant.
They moved for dismissal, claiming immunity as nonresidents.
The present court's reliance on Korff seems to be based on dictum. Korff did not hold
that immunity should not be granted. It held that immunity is not involved in crossactions. However, both Grober and the instant case have interpreted this as a limiting of
the Halsey doctrine.
18. 76 N.J. Super. 252, 184 A.2d 161 (Ch. 1962). G.K. brought an action against H.K.
By order of the New York Supreme Court, G.K. had to take the deposition of a New
Jersey resident before a court commissioner. While in New Jersey for that purpose, he
was served and ordered to appear in the present action against H.K.
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disposition at one time and place of all matters in controversy between
the parties is to be encouraged."' 9 However, he would have stopped there
without overturning Halsey. Justice Francis, dissenting, agreed that the doctrine
should be limited. He disagreed, however, with its limitation in this instance
because defendant "was under a duty to the estate to defend the action, and
seek exoneration of the estate .... ,,20 He argued that the doctrine of immunity
should not be replaced by forum non conveniens, but rather it should be tested
21
by the same underlying considerations.
However, it must be noted that the dissent was more disturbed by the
retrospective effect of the court's holding than by the attendant change of law.2
The instant case, in effect, eliminated all distinctions between residents and
nonresidents and substituted for the immunity doctrine that of forum non con19.

41 N.J. at 287, 196 A.2d at 519.

20. 41 NJ. at 290, 196 A.2d at 520. justice Francis' argument appears to be that this
was not an action where a party was trying to use the court to his own advantage. It
was the special situation where a party enters the State, not on his own behalf, but on the
behalf of another. Inasmuch as he has not entered for himself, he should not be subject to
service in his individual capacity.
21. Considerations underlying the use of forum non conveniens are "the private interest
of the litigant; . . . the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action;
and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive; . . . relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial; . . . administrative dificulties
[of] . . . congested [calendars]; . . . localized controversies [which should be] decided at
home; ... trial . . . in a forum that is at home with the . . . law that must govern the
case ...
" Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 US. 501, 508-09 (1947).
The dissent's argument that immunity be tested by the considerations underlying forum
non conveniens is without basis. There seems to be little difference between replacing
immunity by forum non conveniens or testing it by the same considerations underlying
forum non conveniens. The result is the same.
22. "If the Court wishes to wipe out a nonresident's freedom from service of process
. . . ample justification exists for such a course .... But, in my judgment the overruling
of the immunity principle should be done prospectively and not applied to this case." 41
N.J. at 293, 196 A.2d at 522. The logical outgrowth of Korif and Grober is to withhold
immunity from a nonresident defendant where the factual situation of the two cases is the
same, but this should not bedone where defendant has a fiduciary duty to defend, and
this defense points out the possibility of his personal liability. 41 N.J. at 293-94, 196
A.2d at 522.
However, the decisions point out that "our courts have adhered to the prevailing
common-law doctrine that the overruling of a judicial decision is retrospective in nature."
Arrow Builders Supply Corp. v. Hudson Terrace Apartments, Inc., 16 N.J. 47, 49, 106
A.2d 271 (1954) (per curiam). Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 141
A.2d 273 (1958); Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 164 A.2d 773
(App. Div. 1960). Cf. Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 428-29, 114 A.2d 1, 4 (1955) (dictum),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 942 (1956), adhering to the general rule, but pointing out that it does
not apply "where contract or property rights have vested or where extreme hardship would
result." Id. at 429, 114 A.2d at 4.
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veniens.23 However, the court's apparent hesitancy in not emphatically striking
out for forum non conveniens 24 raises doubt and could possibly create a vacuum
as to the applicable law.
This vacillation was unnecessary. There is little justification for the distinction between residents and nonresidents2 5 and ample justification for the substi23. This suggestion is not new. Substitution has heretofore been advocated in Note,
Immunity of Non-Resident Participants in a Judicial Proceeding from Service of Process
-A Proposal for Renovation, 26 Ind. L.y. 459, 462-65 (1951).
24. On two different occasions, the court's language seems to point out that it has not
thoroughly discarded immunity. "Pursuant to the usual practice under a motion to dismiss
based on forum non conveniens, the granting of immunity will be considered an exception
rather than the rule." Wangler v. Harvey, 41 N.J. at 286, 196 A.2d at 518. (Italics omitted.)
The court said further that if defendant was enticed into the jurisdiction, the trial court
should dismiss. However, it did not say on what grounds. Id. at 287, 196 A.2d at 518.
The court was also silent on the status of statutory immunity.
25. Many arguments have been advanced for the granting of immunity to nonresidents.
The courts ought to be open and accessible to all. Randall v. Randall, 14 N.J. Super. 110,
81 A.2d 400 (Ch. 1951); Riewold v. Riewold, 121 N.J. Eq. 134, 188 Ati. 72 (Ch. 1936);
Halsey v. Stewart, 4 N.J.L. 366 (Sup. Ct. 1817). It prevents hindrance and interruption of
the judicial process. Michaelson v. Goldfarb, 94 N.J.L. 352, 110 Atl. 710 (Sup. Ct. 1920);
Halsey v. Stewart, supra. It maintains the dignity of the court; Randall v. Randall, supra.
It is based on public policy. Ibid.; Klaiber v. Frank, 13 N.J. Super. 388, 80 A.2d 470
(L. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 9 N.J. 1, 86 A.2d 679 (1952); Herman v. Arndt, 116
N.J.L. 150, 182 AUt. 830 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936); Michaelson v. Goldfarb, supra; Brown
v. Brown, 112 N.J. Eq. 600, 165 AUt. 643 (Ch. 1933). It encourages the attendance of
necessary participants. Michaelson v. Goldfarb, supra; Mulhearn v. Press Publishing Co.,
53 N.J.L. 153, 21 Ati. 186 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Massey v. Colville, 45 N.J.L. 119 (Sup. Ct.
1883); Dungan v. Miller, 37 N.J.L. 182 (Sup. Ct. 1874); Halsey v. Stewart, supra;
Prescott v. Prescott, 95 N.J. Eq. 173, 122 AUt. 611 (Ch. 1923).
These arguments have been subjected to strong criticism. The argument that courts
should be accessible to all "cuts both ways and leads to the conclusion that non-resident
parties should be amenable to, rather than privileged from, service of process." Note, 33
Harv. L. Rev. 721, 723 (1920). The application of the doctrine leads to the anomalous
result of closing the courts to residents who want to sue nonresidents. Keeffe & Roscia,
Immunity and Sentimentality, 32 Cornell L.Q. 471, 474 (1947). See Note, 26 Ind. L.J.
459, 460 (1951).
The same treatment can be given to the argument that service interrupts the Judicial
process by distracting suitors. It has been argued that "litigants always and everywhere
are subject to distraction," and that it is illogical to say that distraction will affect a nonresident, but it will not bother a resident. Keeffe & Roscia, supra at 475; Wangler v.
Harvey, 41 N.J. at 284, 196 A.2d at 517. "The test should not be the sentimental one of
distraction but the real one of obstruction." Keeffe & Roscia, supra.
Further, the argument that the dignity of the court is affronted by service of process lost
its vitality when the arrest of parties to a civil action ceased. Wangler v. Harvey, supra.
It seems that the dignity of the court is more affronted than maintained by the granting
of immunity, especially where the court quashes its own process. Keeffe and Roscla, supra
at 477.
It has also been contended that "generally speaking, the public policy [argument Is] . . .
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tution of doctrines, for forum non conveniens ignores technical distinctions and
decides the rights of both26parties by the same standard, i.e., the accomplishment of substantial justice.
Traditionally, immunity was "founded . . . upon the convenience

. . .

of

28
the court itself, '2 7 having for a basic purpose the achievement of justice.
Similarly, "the doctrine of forum non conveniens is .. . [basically] an equitable

one and its application is . .. [discretionary with] the trial court." - ' "[Tihe

ultimate inquiry is where trial will best serve the convenience of the parties and
the ends of justice." 30
When a court, applying the immunity theory, nullifies the service of process,
it must recognize that the defendant was actually served and, realistically, the
court is simply declining to exercise its jurisdiction. Is this result, or the reason
for the result, really any different when, invoking forum non conveniens, the
court acknowledges that service is proper, but it resists jurisdiction to prevent
injustice, even though jurisdiction may be authorized by a general venue
31
statute?
Had the court taken this definitive step, it would not have been necessary
for it to go further to achieve the desired result, for "the present tendency
[in applying forum non conveniens] is to avoid a rigid formula and to weigh
nothing more than a catch-all manner of enunciating all the arguments ... ." Wangler v.
Harvey, supra at 285, 196 A.2d at 517. See Note, 26 Ind. L.J., supra at 461.
It appears that the most valid argument advanced for immunity is that it encourages
the attendance of necessary parties. However, it has been felt that even this should only
apply to witnesses. Wangler v. Harvey, supra at 284, 196 A.2d at 517; Note, 33 Harv. L.
Rev., supra at 723. See cases cited note 6 supra.
26. In a factual situation analogous to the instant case, a New Jersey court held that
forum non conveniens was a proper remedy for a resident who wvas served outside his
home county. Massey v. Colville, 45 N.J.L. 119 (Sup. Ct. 1883). And in Brown v. Brown,
the court, in denying immunity to a resident, stated that "the privilege [of immunity] is
not limited solely to non-residents; it may also be invoked by residents. The relief granted,
however, is different ... (in that a non-resident] is entitled to have the service set aside;
... [while the resident] is only entitled... to be protected as to the venue of the action."
112 N.J. Eq. 600, 601, 165 Ati. 643, 644 (Ch. 1933). See Kutschinski v. Kutschinski, 112
N.J. Eq. 341, 164 Ati. 560 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933), to the same effect.
In the general sense, a change of venue is an intrastate application of forum non
conveniens.
27. Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 225 (1932). The test "is whether the immunity
itself, if allowed, would so obstruct judicial administration in the very cause for the protection of which it is invoked as to justify withholding it." Id. at 228.
28. Baskervlle v. Kofsky, 18 N.J. Misc. 325, 13 A.2d 562 (C.P. 1940).
29. Vargas v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 25 N.J. 293, 295, 135 A.2d 857, 858 (1957) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958 (1958).
30. Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 527 (1947).
31. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947).
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sundry factors, private and public, which beat upon the justness of a plaintiff's
32
choice."
32. Starr v. Berry, 25 N.J. 573, 584, 138 A.2d 44, 49 (1958). A possible motivation for
the court's treatment is that the rejection of immunity is of little consequence. With the
exception of completely foreign actions, personal jurisdiction may be acquired by service In
the defendant's state, provided there are minimal contacts with the forum and sufficient
notice is given to apprise the defendant of the outstanding suit. International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See NJ. Super. Ct. R. 4:4-4 (Summons. Personal
Service). Under the facts in the instant case, personal jurisdiction could have been acquired
through service under R. 4:4-4(i) (cause of action arising out of the ownership of real
property) and can now be acquired under R. 4:4-4(j) (service outside the state) (eff. Jan.
3, 1964).

